Feel free to email me for a copy of any paper.
Publications
Obligations to Know as a Problem for the Ignorance Norm?
American Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming)
American Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming)
Argues that the obligations that permit us to inquire can also forbid inquiry given the Ignorance Norm.
Suboptimal Knowledge
Philosophical Studies · Published version
Philosophical Studies · Published version
Argues that you can know something and still be obligated to inquire into it, which makes some knowledge defective.
Confirmation and Inquisitive Invariance
Thought · Published version
Thought · Published version
A new argument against the “Don’t Believe and Inquire” norm, based on inquiry aimed at confirmation. It works even if interrogative attitudes are essential to inquiry.
Rational Inconsistency Against Non-skeptical Infallibilism
Acta Analytica · Published version
Acta Analytica · Published version
Makes the case that if we can knowingly hold inconsistent rational beliefs, non-skeptical Infallibilism about knowledge is doubtful.
Reconsidering Normative Defeat
Synthese · Published version
Synthese · Published version
Argues that the Doctrine of Normative Defeat has an absurd implication for how lost knowledge gets restored.
On Group Background Beliefs
Philosophical Studies · Published version
Philosophical Studies · Published version
Argues that the Joint Acceptance Account of group belief leads to skepticism about justified group belief.
Under Review
Temporal Symmetries of Inquiry (with Fabrizio Cariani)
Proposes that, holding evidence fixed, you may inquire about a future proposition if and only if you may inquire about it when it's settled in the past.
Strong Hedging and Knowledge Norms
On what hedged assertions like “I believe that p” reveal about knowledge norms of assertion and belief.