Rational Inconsistency Against Non-skeptical Infallibilism
Recent epistemological literature features compelling and novel arguments for thinking that an agent can rationally believe each member of a set of propositions while knowing that one of the members is false. Perhaps more provocatively, these proponents of "Rational Inconsistency," as it were, claim that it's also possible to know each true member of the set while knowing that one of the members is false. Call this "Knowledgeable Inconsistency." In this article, I explain why, if Knowledgeable Inconsistency is true, then, on pain of an absurd implication about how confirmation works, we should reject non-skeptical Infallibilism about knowledge. For that same reason, the recent proponents of Rational Inconsistency should also reject non-skeptical Infallibilism.
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Recent epistemological literature features compelling and novel arguments for thinking that an agent can rationally believe each member of a set of propositions while knowing that one of the members is false. Perhaps more provocatively, these proponents of "Rational Inconsistency," as it were, claim that it's also possible to know each true member of the set while knowing that one of the members is false. Call this "Knowledgeable Inconsistency." In this article, I explain why, if Knowledgeable Inconsistency is true, then, on pain of an absurd implication about how confirmation works, we should reject non-skeptical Infallibilism about knowledge. For that same reason, the recent proponents of Rational Inconsistency should also reject non-skeptical Infallibilism.
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Reconsidering Normative Defeat
According to the Doctrine of Normative Defeat (DND), you may lose justification to believe that p if you fail to possess negatively relevant evidence that you ought to possess. This paper presents an objection to the DND as it's standardly developed: it carries with it an absurd implication regarding how one's knowledge can be restored once one's associated epistemic justification is presumed to be normatively defeated. I defend the force of this objection before closing with a note about what my argument means for the DND's motivation.
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On Group Background Beliefs
In this paper, I argue that the following claims are jointly inconsistent: (1) that an agent’s justification for belief, if it’s constituted by evidence, depends on the profile of her background beliefs, (2) that whether or not a group believes a proposition is solely dependent on whether the proposition is jointly accepted by its members, and (3) that prototypical group beliefs are justified. I also raise objections to attempts to resolve the tension by retaining (2) and (3). The upshot is a novel objection to the Joint Acceptance Account of group belief since it seems to be accompanied by a kind of skepticism.
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Suboptimal Knowledge
I argue for the possibility of suboptimal knowledge: knowledge that’s defective given that the knower ought to inquire. I do this by uniting two independently plausible claims from the literature on inquiry that, at first glance, appear incompatible: there’s the Ignorance Norm, according to which one ought not know that p and inquire into whether p; and there’s the idea that, even if one knows that p, they may still be obligated to inquire into whether p. As I explain, these principles entail the possibility of suboptimal knowledge. Once this argument for suboptimal knowledge is in place, I go on to defend it. Along the way, I identify the relevance and utility of suboptimal knowledge for debates about the epistemic significance of unpossessed evidence, the relationship between knowledge and stakes, and zetetic normativity more generally.
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Confirmation and Inquisitive Invariance
It is often thought that the phenomenon of rational inquiry for the sake of confirmation poses a challenge for Friedman’s “Don’t Believe and Inquire” norm (DBI). It is also often thought that, insofar as that phenomenon really does pose this challenge, it also challenges the claim that inquiry is essentially question-directed and driven by interrogative attitudes. This paper develops a new argument against DBI grounded in the phenomenon of confirmation-driven inquiry. Unlike other arguments of the same type, the present one can presuppose that interrogative attitudes are essential to inquiry.
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Seeking Direct Evidence
This article provides a novel argument against the Ignorance Norm (IGN) according to which a subject who knows that p may not inquire into whether p. With the help of linguistic data and a closure principle for knowledge, I argue that a subject who knows that p based on indirect evidence may inquire into whether p for the sake of more direct evidence. The novelty in the argument, as I show, is that a rational pursuit of direct evidence need not coincide with a pursuit of confirmation.
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This article provides a novel argument against the Ignorance Norm (IGN) according to which a subject who knows that p may not inquire into whether p. With the help of linguistic data and a closure principle for knowledge, I argue that a subject who knows that p based on indirect evidence may inquire into whether p for the sake of more direct evidence. The novelty in the argument, as I show, is that a rational pursuit of direct evidence need not coincide with a pursuit of confirmation.
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Obligations to Know as a Problem for the Ignorance Norm?
Obligations to know appear to generate a neglected problem for the Ignorance Norm on inquiry (IGN). On the one hand, there are clear cases where one is permitted to inquire because one ought to know—for example, a doctor must know his patient’s test results, and so may inquire into them. Call this the ‘Normative Connection Possibility’ (NCP). On the other hand, IGN holds that one ought not both know that P and inquire into whether P. I show that NCP and IGN come into conflict when an obligation to know whether P implies an obligation to know that P. The result is that the very obligations that ground permissions to inquire also generate prohibitions against inquiry. I consider some reconciliation strategies for resolving the conflict—including the view that the conflict is an artifact of Standard Deontic Logic, the denial of obligations to know, and the claim that NCP and IGN concern incommensurate kinds of normativity. I argue that these face challenges. Finally, I show that narrowing the scope of IGN comes with its own related costs.
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Obligations to know appear to generate a neglected problem for the Ignorance Norm on inquiry (IGN). On the one hand, there are clear cases where one is permitted to inquire because one ought to know—for example, a doctor must know his patient’s test results, and so may inquire into them. Call this the ‘Normative Connection Possibility’ (NCP). On the other hand, IGN holds that one ought not both know that P and inquire into whether P. I show that NCP and IGN come into conflict when an obligation to know whether P implies an obligation to know that P. The result is that the very obligations that ground permissions to inquire also generate prohibitions against inquiry. I consider some reconciliation strategies for resolving the conflict—including the view that the conflict is an artifact of Standard Deontic Logic, the denial of obligations to know, and the claim that NCP and IGN concern incommensurate kinds of normativity. I argue that these face challenges. Finally, I show that narrowing the scope of IGN comes with its own related costs.
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